No Fixed Deadline or Remedy for Unreasonable Sentencing Delay: R v RB-C
The Charter guarantees everyone charged with an offence the right to be tried within a reasonable time. But what happens when the trial is over, guilt has been decided, and it's the sentencing that drags on? In R v RB-C, 2026 SCC 30, a unanimous Supreme Court of Canada confirmed that this right extends through to the imposition of sentence — but held that there is no fixed deadline for the sentencing phase, and that the usual remedy for unreasonable sentencing delay is a reduced sentence, not the end of the prosecution.
What Happened
R.B.-C., an Iranian citizen living in Canada on a post-graduation work permit, was found guilty of sexual assault in October 2021. Sentencing began immediately, but stretched across more than a year of court appearances: an adjournment to obtain trial transcripts, a hearing cut short by technical problems during the pandemic, dates lost to the judge's unavailability, and repeated requests for further submissions on how a conviction and sentence would affect his immigration status.
Just as sentencing was set to conclude, R.B.-C. applied for a stay of proceedings — a permanent halt to the case — arguing the delay violated his right under s. 11(b) of the Charter. The sentencing judge dismissed the application and, more than fourteen months after the verdict, imposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day, followed by probation. The Court of Appeal for Ontario found the delay unreasonable and reduced the conditional sentence to twenty months. The Supreme Court took the case to decide how sentencing delay should be assessed across the country.
The Right to Be Tried Within a Reasonable Time
Section 11(b) of the Charter protects people from being left in limbo by slow-moving prosecutions. In Jordan, decided in 2016, the Supreme Court gave the right teeth by setting "presumptive ceilings" for the time from charge to the end of trial: eighteen months in provincial court, thirty months in superior court. Delay beyond the ceiling is presumed unreasonable, and the remedy is dramatic: an automatic stay of proceedings, without a balancing of competing interests.
Jordan left open what happens after a verdict. In Charley, decided in 2019, the Court of Appeal for Ontario extended Jordan's logic to the sentencing phase, creating a five-month presumptive ceiling for post-verdict delay. That was the law in Ontario until now.
What the Supreme Court Decided
Writing for a unanimous nine-judge Court, Justice Martin confirmed that s. 11(b) "attaches to each of the many stages in a criminal proceeding," from the laying of the charge to the final imposition of sentence (para. 1).
But the Court overruled Charley and declined to set any ceiling for sentencing delay. The Jordan ceilings responded to documented, systemic evidence of a "culture of complacency" in bringing accused persons to trial; no comparable evidence exists for the sentencing phase (paras. 42-43). And sentencing itself is an individualized, information-gathering process that legitimately varies in length: pre-sentence reports, reports into the social context of the accused, contested factual hearings, victim impact statements, and submissions on immigration or other collateral consequences may all reasonably take time (paras. 33-36).
Instead, a person alleging unreasonable sentencing delay must show the sentencing took "markedly longer than it reasonably should have" in all the circumstances — the same test that applies to below-ceiling trial delay under Jordan (para. 47). The standard is objective: the question is how long sentencing should take in a properly functioning justice system, not how long it happens to take where resources are stretched (paras. 52, 60-61). Relevant considerations include (paras. 55-59):
the overall length of the delay;
the complexity of the sentencing exercise;
the explanations for specific periods of delay;
the parties' positions and conduct; and
how long comparable cases typically take locally.
On remedy, the Court held that the automatic stay available for pre-trial delay does not carry over. Once guilt has been validly established, the offender's s. 11(b) interests, while still real, are attenuated, and society's interest in a prompt, fit sentence takes on heightened importance (para. 65). The ordinary remedy is a reduced sentence — not as extra "mitigation," but as a constitutional remedy directed at the breach itself (para. 77). A stay remains available, but only in the clearest of cases (para. 78).
The Result in This Case
Applying its new test, the Court found the breach made out. No single delay was remarkable on its own, but taken together — alongside the modest complexity of the case and the incremental way the immigration issue was addressed — the sentencing took markedly longer than it reasonably should have (para. 83). The Court upheld the reduction of the conditional sentence to twenty months as a proper and proportionate remedy, and dismissed the appeal (paras. 84-85).
Why This Decision Matters
RB-C. resets the law of sentencing delay nationwide. Ontario's five-month benchmark is gone, replaced by a flexible test that puts the burden on the person raising the delay. The decision draws a sharp line between the two phases of a criminal case: before verdict, delay past the ceiling presumptively ends the prosecution; after verdict, it ordinarily results in a shorter sentence.
What This Means If You Are Facing Charges
If you have been convicted and your sentencing is taking an unusually long time, you still have rights — the Charter follows your case through to sentence. But there is no automatic deadline. Obtaining a remedy means showing the process took markedly longer than it reasonably should have, and the likely result is a reduction of your sentence rather than an end to the case. Careful documentation of the sources of delay, and pressing for timely dates, now matter more than ever.
Our Firm's Involvement
Our firm appeared before the Supreme Court as counsel for the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, which intervened on the scope of s. 11(b) protections in the sentencing phase.